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We exploit time variation in the degree of development of local credit markets and matched employer-employee
data to assess the role of the firm as an internal credit market. In less developed local credit markets
firms can offer a flatter wage-tenure profile than firms in more developed credit markets to lend implicitly
to their workers or offer a steeper profile to implicitly borrow from their workers. We find that firms
located in less financially developed markets offer wages that are lower at the beginning of tenure
and grow faster than those offered by firms in more financially developed markets, helping firms finance
their operations by raising funds from workers. Because we control for local market effects and only
exploit time variation in the degree of local financial development induced by an exogenous liberalization,
the effect we find is unlikely to reflect unobserved local factors that systematically affect wage tenure
profiles. The size of implicit loans is larger for firms with more problematic access to bank credit and
workers less likely to face credit constraints. The amount of credit generated by implicit lending within
the firm is economically important and can be as large as 30% of bank lending. Consistent with credit
market imperfections opening up trade opportunities within the firm, we find that the internal rate
of return of implicit loans lies between the rate at which workers savings are remunerated in the market





















In an economy with nancial frictions the rm ceases to be merely a place where production
occurs. The pooling of assets and human capital, besides allowing production of goods and services,
naturally creates a \market" where implicit labor contracts can be designed to redistribute factor
rewards across states or over time, partially overcoming the consequences of imperfect insurance
and nancial markets. In the implicit contract literature, dierences in preferences for risk makes it
optimal for risk neutral entrepreneurs to oer insurance to risk averse workers (Knight 1921, Baily
1974, Azariadis 1975). In this setting rms eectively smooth workers' consumption across states
when insurance markets fail to work due to moral hazard or limited commitment problems. In a
similar spirit, the wage contract may re
ect opportunities to redistribute factor rewards across time
when access to the credit market is limited or too costly. By tilting the wage prole relative to its
frictionless counterpart, the payment of wages over the course of an employer-employee relationship
can be front-loaded or back-loaded, thus making funds available to the party - the worker or the
rm - that currently needs them most.
This paper focuses on the role of the employment relationship as an implicit credit market and
tests how credit frictions in local nancial markets are re
ected in the wage contract that rms and
workers agree upon. The key idea is that the relative ease to access credit should be re
ected in the
shape (slope and location) of the wage prole. If rms have easier access to the loan market than
workers and/or are less in need of cash (e.g., because they are well endowed with collateral, can
produce hard information, or can - more easily than workers - establish repeated relationships with
their lenders), they can lend implicitly to their credit constrained workers by oering a wage prole
that, over the workers' tenure with the rm, is 
atter than the prole the same workers would
face in a frictionless environment. In other words, the worker achieves consumption smoothing by
having the rm oer a smooth income prole rather than borrowing from nancial intermediaries.
This case is examined by Azariadis (1988), who studies a setting where, due to extreme adverse
selection, workers are excluded from the loan market while rms have perfect access to it. Since
loan repayment promises, as re
ected in the wage tenure prole, are not enforceable, what makes
it possible for lending within the rm to take place is workers' investment in rm-specic human
capital, which reduces workers' incentive to leave the rm before repayment.
Implicit lending opportunities need not be limited to the case of workers borrowing from the
rm. After all, rms even more than workers are users of capital to nance their investment
plans and rms may also have limited access to the nancial market, as a large literature on rm
borrowing constraints suggests (see e.g., the surveys in Hubbard (1998) and Stein & Center (2003)).
1Michelacci & Quadrini (2009) study this case and show that a credit-constrained rm can at least
partly make up for the shortage of capital by reshaping the workers' wage contract relative to its
frictionless equivalent. In particular, the rm may pay workers less at the beginning of their tenure
and more towards the end, resulting in a steeper wage prole relative to the case in which access to
credit is unimpeded. In this setting, contracts can be made self-enforceable by rms' investment in
worker-specic human capital, which limits rms' incentives to re a worker that has lent implicitly
to it. But alternative mechanisms - such as the existence of ring costs or reputational concerns -
may in practice also serve the same scope.
To test the role of the rm as an internal credit market and establish the direction of implicit
credit 
ows, we use two sources of data. First, we rely on matched Italian longitudinal rm-
employee data. The data report workers' wages and employment histories over a long span of time
(1974-1997) allowing us to construct tenure and experience proles. Second, we exploit systematic
dierences in nancial development across local markets that exist at the start of our sample
period and, most importantly, exogenous changes in these dierences induced by the nancial
market liberalization of the 1990s. Under the well-grounded assumption that rms, particularly
small ones, and a fortiori workers can only borrow locally (Petersen & Rajan 2002), workers
and rms' ability to borrow in the market are directly tied to the degree of local credit market
development. Variations in the latter should then be re
ected in the slope and location of the wage
prole experienced by workers joining the rm in dierent time periods. We construct an index
of nancial market backwardness as the \excess" spread between loan rates and deposit rates that
a given rm faces in its local credit market relative to what an observationally equivalent rm
borrowing from an observationally equivalent bank would face in the most developed local credit
market. We then attach to each worker-rm relationship the degree of backwardness in their local
credit market at the time tenure with the rm starts, and use a two-step estimation strategy to
identify how the slope and intercept of the wage-tenure prole respond as the degree of nancial
development varies over time and spatially across local markets. This two-step strategy allows us
to address the endogeneity of tenure and labor market experience and the endogenous sorting into
rms. We nd that wage proles are steeper and have a lower intercept when rms face a less
developed local credit market, which is consistent with the hypothesis that workers lend implicitly
to their rms.
To give a sense of the magnitudes involved, we calculate that the entry wage of a worker
matched with a rm facing a local market that has an index of nancial backwardness 50% above
the median is 17.8 percent lower than that of a (observationally equivalent) worker matched with a
2(observationally equivalent) rm facing the median local credit market. Moreover, her wage grows
at a rate that is 0.32 percent faster for each month of tenure. This implies that a typical worker
will be lending to the rm over the rst 54 months (4.5 years) of his tenure before starting to be
\paid back".
These implicit wage contractual dierences can generate substantial 
ows of funds from workers
to rms. A representative rm located in the median developed credit market raises from workers
as much funds as 11 percent of what it gets from banks. This share increases to 30 percent for
a rm located in a market at the 75th percentile of our index of nancial market backwardness.
Our estimates of the internal rates of return of these implicit loans range between 1 and 4 percent,
depending on the degree of nancial development. Interestingly, these rates always sit between the
rate on deposits (a measure of the return to workers' savings) and the rate on bank loans (the cost
of rm debt), conrming the mutual advantage for contracting by workers and rms in imperfect
nancial markets.
Since the response of wage contracts to nancial market imperfections should depend on rm
and worker characteristics, we rely on observable heterogeneity to further corroborate our ndings.
We nd that rms with plausibly more problematic access to the loan market, as measured by the
credit score they receive from credit bureaus, react to nancial market imperfections by oering
steeper wage proles than rms with easier access to loans - conditioning on being located in the
same credit market. This is consistent with the idea that rms with more problematic access
to credit need to rely on implicit borrowing from workers more than those with easier access.
Interestingly, this nding is inconsistent with our results simply capturing the idea that better
access to the loan market raises investment in human capital and hence the steepness of the wage
prole. If this were the case, we should nd that, as access to credit markets deteriorates, rms
with a bad credit score should oer 
atter proles as they curtail investment (including investment
in human capital) compared to better score rms. We nd the exact opposite. Similarly, we nd
that workers who have presumably better access to the loan market and thus better alternative
sources of consumption smoothing, as measured by their job position, face a steeper wage tenure
prole in response to nancial market frictions than workers with more problematic access to the
market. This is in line with the idea that workers that are less dependent on borrowing are also
more willing to implicitly lend to the rm.
Several papers have studied the occurrence of lending within the rm from a theoretical per-
spective. Besides Azariadis (1988) and Michelacci & Quadrini (2005, 2009), Bernhardt & Timmis
(1990) were among the rst to formalize the idea, already noticed in Azariadis (1975), that the
3employment relationship can help to \complete" nancial markets when the workers cannot use
human capital as collateral and are thus excluded from credit markets or when rms face borrowing
restrictions due to nancial frictions. More recently, Burdett & Coles (2003) study a labor market
where rms post wage-tenure contracts and show that in equilibrium wages increase with tenure
and the structure of the contracts re
ects both the workers' preferences as well as the parameters
of market environment that rms and workers face, including nancial frictions. Our paper is,
as far as we know, the rst to systematically undertake the empirical task of showing how credit
market frictions shape the wage contracts. The closest predecessor to our paper is Brandt & Ho-
sios (1996). In a fascinating empirical contribution they use data on wage/employers contracts for
some villages in 1936 rural China where presumably nancial markets were absent. They show
that wage contracts do indeed generate lending, whose direction - from the employer to the worker
or vice versa - depends on preference parameters and the initial endowments of the two parties.
However, in Brandt & Hosios (1996) credit frictions are given and taken as a realistic feature of
the environment. In contrast, our main contribution is to establish how wage contracts respond to
observed and measured dierences in the nancial markets that rms and workers face in a modern
economy. Michelacci & Quadrini (2009) exploit the joint implications of their model on the wage
process and rm dynamics to test for the existence of credit 
ows from workers to rms. In their
model, credit constrained rms pay initially lower wages and grow faster than unconstrained rms
as they borrow from workers to reach the optimal size; moreover, wages also grow faster with rm
growth, as workers are \paid back" as the rm approaches the optimal size and credit constraints
are relaxed. Using Finnish matched data, they nd that wage growth is positively related to rm
growth and starting wages are negatively related to future rm growth, consistent with the model's
predictions. Dierently from these estimates, which use rms' dynamics to proxy for nancial con-
straints, we directly relate the wage-tenure prole to measured frictions in local nancial markets.
More broadly, our paper contributes to a literature that studies the interrelations between credit
and nancial markets (i.e., Wasmer & Weil 2004, Benmelech, Bergman & Enriquez 2010). Our
paper is also related to the debate on the returns to tenure (Altonji & Shakotko 1987, Altonji &
Williams 2005, Topel 1991) and on the factors that aect them (see Dustmann & Meghir (2005)
and references therein). In particular, Abowd, Kramarz & Roux (2006) document both hetero-
geneity in returns to tenure and a tendency for returns to be higher in low starting-wage rms.
Recognizing that the wage-tenure prole also re
ects implicit credit 
ows contributes to explaining
both ndings.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our empirical strategy
4and reviews some of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the sources
of variation in local nancial market development. Section 4 illustrates the identication strategy
behind our two-step estimator. Section 5 shows the main estimation results. We exploit hetero-
geneity in rms and workers to further corroborate our ndings in Section 6 and perform a series
of robustness checks in Section 7. Section 8 estimates the size of implicit lending within the rm
and Section 9 concludes.
2 \Credit regimes" and Wage Tenure Proles
2.1 Cases of Interest
To illustrate how ineciencies in local credit markets can aect (implicit) wage contracts, consider
the following log wage equation:
lnwij(p;t0)t =  + Tij(p;t0)t + Lj(p;t0) + 
Tij(p;t0)t  Lj(p;t0) + "ij(p;t0)t (1)
for t = 1;2;:::;T. The actual wage equation we estimate below controls for a variety of other
characteristics; here we use (1) for illustrative purposes. The subscript j (p;t0) indexes the rm
j located in market p that the worker joined in year t0, i indexes the individual, and t indexes
the current year. In (1) Tij(p;t0)t is tenure (hence Tij(p;t0)t = (t   t0)), and Lj(p;t0) is a continuous
measure of the degree of nancial market imperfection in the area where rm j is located. Without
loss of generality, we normalize Lj(p;t0) = 0 in the most developed credit market. We assume that
the relevant credit market imperfections for the wage contract set with worker i are those that
prevail at the time of hiring; hence, we do not consider the possibility of renegotiation.
Figure 1 illustrates the possible cases of interest. In the baseline case (Lj(p;t0) = 0) the initial
wage is  and it grows at rate  per month of tenure with the rm. The signs of  and 
 determine
the type of \credit regime" in which workers and rms operate. Consider rst case I, in which

 < 0 and  > 0; implying that the wage prole in more backward credit markets is 
atter than
in more developed markets. Here, workers are implicitly borrowing from the rm. Their wage
payments are front-loaded. This tilting of the wage prole may be interpreted as a response to
credit market imperfections when workers and rms can establish long-term relationships through,
for example, rm-specic human capital investments. In a perfect credit market, individuals with
the growing wage-productivity prole depicted in the baseline case would borrow from banks at the
start of their relationship with the rm to smooth consumption intertemporally. However, acquiring
reliable information about aspects of the exchange relation between employer and employees may be
costly for banks, which respond by limiting credit (in the extreme, denying access to it altogether).
5Figure 1: Credit 
ows and tenure proles.
Azariadis (1988) and Bernhardt & Timmis (1990) were among the rst to suggest that in this case
the rm can act as a \lender of last resort" for its workers, implicitly lending to them by oering a
wage prole that is 
atter than in the frictionless case. In other words, in underdeveloped nancial
markets consumption smoothing is achieved through wage smoothing (or implicit borrowing), rather
than through (or in addition to) formal borrowing.
There is an opposite view about the shape of the wage-tenure prole, articulated in Michelacci
& Quadrini (2005, 2009). The intertemporal exchange may involve a liquidity-constrained rm
implicitly borrowing from its workers. This can be achieved by back-loading wages, i.e., paying
lower wages at the beginning of the worker-rm relationship (relative to the frictionless case) in
exchange for higher wages at a later stage. This corresponds to case II in Figure 1. Here 
 > 0
and  < 0 and the wage prole in less developed credit markets is steeper than in more developed
credit markets.
Which of the two \credit regimes" shapes the wage-tenure prole? The answer depends on the
signs of  and 
. We estimate these two parameters below using variation over time in access to
credit in the location where the employment relationship takes place. The estimation procedure
allows us to distinguish between the two above hypotheses. Other confounding issues are discussed
6below.1
2.2 Enforcement and Alternative Stories
What makes the contracts discussed above enforceable? Given that they involve implicit promises,
they are not legally enforceable. However, as remarked by, among others, Azariadis (1988), Lazear
(1981) and Michelacci & Quadrini (2009), specic human capital investments can be sucient to
make these contracts self-enforceable. In case I workers have little incentive to quit before re-
payment if they have made rm-specic human capital investments. In case II rms have little
incentive to re workers before their loans are fully repaid if they have made worker-specic in-
vestments. If specic human capital were not enough to make these contracts self-enforcing, e.g.,
because human capital is (mostly) specic to the industry rather than to the rm (as argued by
Neal 1995), or specic to an occupation rather than to a worker, enforcement may be provided
by other mechanisms. For instance, reputational concerns may facilitate implicit contract enforce-
ment if the borrower's behavior is public information. Firing and higher costs on the rms' side
and mobility costs on the workers' side may also contribute to reduce the incentive to terminate
the employment relationship to avoid repayment.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the dierence between the cases discussed in this section and
that studied by Lazear (1981), in which rms tilt upward the wage prole relative to the worker's
productivity prole to induce workers to exert eort. If one assumes that in the baseline case
wages coincide with productivity, it would appear that the nding that the wage prole is steeper
in more backward credit markets relative to the baseline (which turns out to be the empirically
relevant case) can be made consistent both with an incentive story  a la Lazear and a liquidity-
constraint story  a la Michelacci-Quadrini. Notice however that while in Lazear it is true that the
rm \implicitly" borrows from its workers at the beginning of their relationship, the borrowing
is incidental (it is the only way to implement the incentive aspect of the wage prole) and it is
independent of whether the rm is liquidity constrained. As we shall see, this is not going to be the
case empirically: more implicit borrowing is found among rms that are presumably more liquidity
constrained.
Unfortunately we cannot test whether a Lazear-type mechanism is at work because we do not
observe productivity. However, we stress that our test is valid even if such mechanism is indeed at
work. Figure 2 illustrates this point graphically. The heavy dotted line represents the unobserved
1Of course, there are two other cases that may emerge empirically: 
 > 0 and  > 0, and 
 < 0 and  < 0. These
cases would be inconsistent with our interpretation that dierences in the wage-tenure prole across local nancial
markets re
ect implicit credit 
ows between rms and workers, thus providing a direct falsication test for our story.
7worker's productivity prole. In the baseline (no liquidity constraints or Lj(p;t0) = 0), the wage
prole is steeper than the productivity prole to supply incentives for workers. If rms are subject
to liquidity constraints (case II above), they would make the wage prole even steeper for the
additional purpose of borrowing implicitly from workers. The case of workers borrowing from rms
(case I above) is aptly described by the following quote from Lazear's paper: \if workers have utility
functions which are time separable and concave in income, then the optimal [wage] path will remain
upward sloping,2 even if all borrowing is prohibited, but will tend to be somewhat 
atter than it is
when no borrowing constraints are imposed" [italics added]. Hence, the wage prole would be still
steeper than the productivity prole, but less steep than in a perfectly functioning credit market
(where Lj(p;t0) = 0). This is exactly the eect we are studying.3
Figure 2: Credit 
ows and tenure proles with tenure considerations.
2In Lazear's case productivity is 
at due to absence of specic human capital.
3Lazear-type mechanisms may pose a dierent problem for our estimates. Since we rely on geographical variation
in access to the credit market, one may argue that heterogeneity in local credit market development may be correlated
with shirking. If in a province individuals are more prone to shirk on the job, they may also be more likely to default
on loans, making banks less willing to lend. However, as we discuss in Section 4, our identication strategy relies
on geographical heterogeneity in variation over time in nancial development and the eect of local factors on wage
tenure proles, including diversity across areas in shirking attitudes, are captured by province dummies.
83 Data
To identify the eect of credit market imperfections on wage contracts, we need longitudinal data
on workers' histories with the rms they have worked for and local credit markets that dier in e-
ciency. Italy oers both. First, administrative data from the Italian Social Security Administration
allow us to obtain information on workers' earnings histories matched with their rms. Second, due
to a number of \accidents of history" dating back to at least the 1930s, the development of Italian
credit markets has diered markedly across localities as small as provinces (the equivalent of a US
county). As a consequence of these initial disparities, credit market liberalization that took place
over the 1990s dierentially aected local credit markets. Hence, access to external nance for
workers and rms in dierent areas diers greatly, dierentially aecting their incentives to make
up for these ineciencies in the wage contracts. In what follows, we illustrate the main features
of the data and of the procedure to construct the indicator of local nancial market development,
referring the interested reader to the data appendix for further details.
3.1 Worker Wages and Firm Characteristics
We obtain wage data from the Italian Social Security registry (INPS) which provides information
on total compensation and its components for a sample of workers. The INPS data are provided for
the entire population of workers registered with the social security system whose birthday falls on
either March 1st or October 1st. Data are available on a continuous basis from 1974 to 2002. The
data cover private sector employees (but not the self-employed or public employees) and derive from
employer forms roughly comparable to those collected by the Social Security Administration in the
US.4 Misreporting is prosecuted. Besides providing information on workers earnings, the INPS
data also contain some demographics. However, as is typical of administrative data, demographics
information is scant and limited to age, gender, place of birth, and job category (blue collar, white
collar or manager).
For our estimates we restrict the sample to workers aged between 18 and 60 observed over the
years 1990-1997. We do not use data after 1997 because INPS switched to a new data archiving
system (from OM1 to SA770). We do not use data before 1990 because (as we explain below) we
do not have information on local credit market imperfections before that date. However, we use
the INPS data before 1990 to construct measures of actual labor market experience and tenure
with the rm. Each record in the original data set is a social security contribution record for a
4While the US administrative data are usually provided on a grouped basis, INPS has truly individual records.
Moreover, US earnings records are censored at Social Security cap, while the Italian data set is not subject to
top-coding.
9given worker/rm/year observation. For each record, there is information about which months the
worker was employed at that rm. Apart from self-employment or public employment spells, our
measures of labor market experience and tenure should thus be free from measurement error (at
least for those observed after 1974). We construct gross monthly earnings (our measure of wage in
the regressions below) as total yearly earnings with a rm divided by the number of months the
worker has been employed by the rm in that year. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the
sample of workers used in estimation. Further details are in Appendix A.1.
We use rm data from the Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci, or CB for
brevity) matched with Credit Register (CR) data for the same rms.5 The CB data span from
1982 onwards and give detailed information on a large number of balance-sheet items together with
a full description of rm characteristics (location, year of foundation, sector, ownership structure),
plus other variables of economic interest usually not included in balance sheets, such as 
ow of
funds. Company accounts are collected for approximately 30,000 rms per year by the Service; as
we explain in detail in the appendix, the data quality is high and the sample covers a large fraction
of overall production. For our purposes the most important feature of the matched CB/CR data
set is that it provides for each rm and for all the years from 1990 to 1997 two types of relevant
information. First, the interest rate on credit lines charged by each bank that lends to the rm. We
use these data to create a provincial measure of nancial development, as described in Subsection
3.4. Second, a credit score used by banks when screening rms and allocating credit. As we
will discuss later, this is a particularly attractive measure of rm-level creditworthiness which will
prove useful when we look at heterogeneity in rms' motives for relying on internal lending. For
the latter purpose, we merge the INPS worker data set with the CB/CR data set. This is possible
because the INPS data provide us with the employer's tax code. Since our INPS data contains
information only on a sample of workers, when we merge them with the CB/CR data set we lose
observations. The matched employer-employee dataset (with information on both worker and rm
characteristics) has 106,277 records, with information for 15,179 rms and 24,639 workers (note
however that some rms have missing records on the credit score variable in some years).6 Table
2 reports summary statistics for the sample of rms used to construct the measure of nancial
development (see below).
5More details on the matched CB/CR dataset can be found in Panetta, Schivardi & Shum (2009).
6See Guiso, Pistaferri & Schivardi (2005) for more details on the matched employer-employee data set.
103.2 Measuring Financial Development
To implement our test we require that rms and their workers, though located within the borders
of the same country, have dierential access to the loan market. Variation of this sort may arise
if: (a) credit markets are geographically segmented so that a worker or a rm located in a certain
local market is bound to borrow in that market; and (b) local credit markets dier in their degree
of development.
There is ample evidence that rms, particularly small businesses like the ones in our sample
(and thus a fortiori single individuals) are tied to their local credit markets. For instance, Petersen
& Rajan (2002) show that lending to small businesses is a highly localized activity as proximity
between borrowers and lenders facilitates information acquisition.7 Segmentation of local credit
markets is thus very likely to occur. Our geographical unit is the province, an administrative unit
roughly comparable to a US county. Provinces are a proper measure of local markets in banking
for at least three reasons. First, this was the denition of a local market used by the Bank of Italy
to decide whether to authorize the opening of new branches when entry was regulated. Second,
according to the Italian Antitrust authority the "relevant market" in banking for antitrust purposes
is the province. Third, the bankers' rule of thumb is to avoid lending to a client located more than
three miles from the branch. At the time of our data, there were 95 provinces.
Due to a number of historical legacies surveyed in detail by Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2004,
2006), Italian local credit markets traditionally dier in their degree of development in ways that
are plausibly unrelated to dierences in the level of economic development. Such dierences can
be traced back to the dierent political traditions before the country was unied at the end of the
nineteenth century. Moreover, they have been perpetuated by a 1936 banking law that, in response
to the 1929 crises, heavily regulated the sector, with strong limits to entry and expansion of banks.
This regulatory system was maintained almost unchanged until the late 1980s, preserving and
actually amplifying the dierences in nancial development across local markets that existed in the
early 1930s. Hence, when at the beginning of the 1990s the process of nancial liberalization started,
it displayed its eects on a set of heterogeneously developed local credit markets. As a consequence
of these dierent initial conditions, nancial liberalization was relatively more benecial to local
markets that were lagging behind as of 1990. We will exploit these dierential geographical eects
of nancial liberalization to identify the eect of credit market imperfections on wage contracts.
7Bofondi & Gobbi (2006) show direct evidence of the informational disadvantage of distant lenders in Italy. They
nd that banks entering new markets suer a higher incidence of non performing loans. This increase, however, is
more limited if they lend through a newly opened local branch than if they lend at a distance. Degryse & Ongena
(2005) nd that small rms' loan conditions depend on distance. Lerner (1995) documents the importance of distance
in the venture capital market.
11A good measure of nancial development would be the ease with which individuals that need
external funds can obtain them and/or the premium (adjusted for risk) they have to pay for these
funds; in fact, in a perfect credit market this premium would be zero. The key idea is to exploit
the geographic variation in access to the credit market or in its cost to estimate the ease with
which otherwise equal rms or workers can obtain lending in two dierent local markets. Here we
follow Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2006) and use the variation across rms in the cost at which
they can borrow to obtain a measure of the eciency of the local credit market. We use the
matched CB/CR data containing information on the interest rate on credit lines charged by each
bank that lends to the rm. We then compute the interest rate spread with respect to the rate
on deposits in the province where the rm is located to obtain a measure of the mark-up on loans
and argue that banking markets that, ceteris paribus, are characterized by larger mark-ups, are
less nancially developed.8 More formally, let sjbpt denote the interest rate spread (relative to the
province's average deposit rate) paid by rm j to bank b in market p in year t, Fjpt denote a vector
of rm controls and Bbpt denote a vector of bank controls.9 We run the regression
sjbpt = tFjpt + 
tBbpt + fpt + jbpt (2)
where fpt is a vector of province-year xed eects that captures the time variation at the local
level in nancial development, following the process of nancial liberalization over the 1990s. We
estimate equation (2) year by year between 1990 and 1997, and retrieve the estimated xed eect
b fpt for each one of the 95 provinces in which the country is divided and for each year between 1990
8One criticism to this indicator is that it is based on the cost of obtaining a loan rather than the amount one can
obtain; another is that it relies on rms' ease in accessing local credit markets and ignores workers' access. Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales (2004) use a similar methodology but rely instead on data from the Survey of Households Income
and Wealth (SHIW) on households that were turned down by a bank to obtain a measure of nancial development
across Italian regions (which are larger geographical units than the province). This measure of nancial development
is highly correlated with the one we use; as shown by Guiso et al. (2006) this indicator can explain about 25% of the
variation in the interest rate spread across provinces in 1990. Thus, in local markets where, ceteris paribus, workers
are more likely to be turned down when applying for loans, the pricing of a granted loan to rms deviates more from
the competitive benchmark. Furthermore, the variation over time in the fraction of households that were turned
down is consistent with that in the spread indicator. Casolaro, Gambacorta & Guiso (2006) document that while
the fraction of applicants that were turned down was around 50% before nancial liberalization, it fell to 25% in
1998 and to 10% in 2002. Unfortunately, there are not enough data in the SHIW to obtain reliable estimates of the
variation over time at the province level in the fraction of people that were turned down and use this as an alternative
indicator of the change in local nancial development.
9Firm controls make sure that province xed eects do not re
ect borrowers' dierences in riskiness while bank
controls make sure that they do not re
ect dierences across banks in the cost of making loans. Firm controls include
the rm return on sales, its leverage (as a proxy for nancial fragility), its size (measured by log assets) to capture
the fact that smaller rms are more likely to fail, and the rm credit score. The latter is a particularly good control
for rm riskiness as it is used by the banks that belong to the CB consortium to decide whether to grant a loan and
to price it. As bank controls we use: the size of the lending bank (measured by log assets), its return on assets, the
ratio of non-performing loans on total loans outstanding, and dummies for state or local government bank ownership.
Since the same rm often borrows from multiple banks (see Detragiache, Garella & Guiso 2000), as an alternative to
these bank controls we insert a full set of bank dummies obtaining very similar results.
12and 1997. Finally, we dene our indicator of nancial backwardness by recentering the measure as:
Lpt = b fpt  min(b fpt). Hence, the most developed (i.e., the most competitive local credit market) is
set to zero and the measure of nancial backwardness is the deviation of the interest rate spread
from the province where it is smallest.
Table 3 shows for each province the mean value of our measure of nancial market backwardness,
the value in 1990 - the rst year in the sample - and the change in the indicator between 1990 and
1997 (our last sample year). There is ample variation across areas with a clear geographical pattern
that shows more nancially backward provinces, both at the beginning of sample and on average,
in the Southern regions.10 This is more clearly visible in Figure 3, which reports the map of
our average measure by province. While a North-South divide is a feature of the data, there is
considerable variation in nancial development within the Center-North and the South.
At the beginning of the sample period, before the liberalization process started, the least -
nancially developed province was Cosenza (in the Southern region of Calabria) while the most
developed was Ravenna (in Emilia, one of the Northern regions); the interest rate spread between
these two local markets was close to 400 basis points with a standard deviation across all markets
of 81 basis points, implying highly segmented local credit markets and substantial dispersion in
nancial development. Dierences across provinces in variation over time are also very pronounced
(third column) with a standard deviation of 71 basis points. This is reassuring, since we will
primarily use the time variation in the degree of nancial backwardness to identify its eect on
wage contracts (see the next section for details). Interestingly, provinces that were more backward
just before the liberalization started are the ones where the improvement in nancial development
has been more marked. This is consistent with our contention that less developed markets benet
more from nancial liberalization, providing the basis for our identication strategy. We document
formally the convergence induced by the liberalization process in Table 4, which shows growth-type
regressions of the change in nancial backwardness between 1990 and 1997 on the initial value. The
size of the negative coecient on the initial level of Lp in column 1 implies that a province with a
level of nancial backwardness that was one standard deviation above the mean in 1990 has experi-
enced a decline in the interest rate spread of 40 basis points. Convergence is apparent from Figure
10 Sicily is an exception as it shows lower values of the index of nancial backwardness than other provinces in
the South. This is most likely a consequence of a dierent regime of regulations that prevailed in Sicily since the
post war period. In Sicily the authorization to open new banks and new bank branches was granted by the regional
government rather than by the Bank of Italy. As a consequence, the number of local bank branches over a 20 year
period went up by 586% compared to a national average of 83% and the number of banks went up by 21% while it
was shrinking in the rest of the country. This is hard to explain with economic convergence but is consistent with
the less stringent regulatory regime. At any rate, excluding Sicily from our sample does not change the results (see
Table 10).
13Figure 3: Credit market backwardness, Italian provinces, 1990
 
4, which plots the change in the backwardness indicator against its value in 1990, together with
the regression line of Table 4. To investigate further the idea that heterogeneity across provinces in
the eects of nancial liberalization on nancial development is due to the dierences in the level
of nancial development that prevailed just before the liberalization started and that were largely
the unintended consequence of the 1936 banking regulation, in the second column we report IV
regressions where the 1990 level of nancial backwardness is instrumented with measures of the
structure of the banking industry in the region in 1936 as constructed by Guiso et al. (2004). The
IV regressions conrm the OLS estimates, showing convergence after liberalization.
14Figure 4: The convergence process
4 Identication
We now discuss identication of the shift in the slope and intercept of the wage-tenure prole
induced by local credit market imperfections. We expand (1) and rewrite it as:
lnwij(p;t0)t =  + X0
ij(p;t0)t + Z0
i + Eit + Tij(p;t0)t + Lj(p;t0)
+
Tij(p;t0)t  Lj(p;t0) + Tij(p;t0)t  hp + hp + "ij(p;t0)t (3)
where X0
ij(p;t0)t and Z0
i are two vectors of time varying and time invariant worker characteristics,
respectively, Eit a measure of the worker overall labor market experience and hp a vector of provin-
cial dummies. This specication allows for province eects both in the level of wage rates and in
the returns to tenure. In particular, this formulation implies that any eect that dierences in the
average level of nancial backwardness have on the intercept and the slope of the wage contract are
captured by the province xed eects in the level and growth equations, respectively. The vector
X0
ij(p;t0)t also includes year eects.
Assume that the structure of the error term in (3) is as follows:
"ij(t0)t = ai + bij(t0) + cit (4)
Here ai is an individual xed eect (\ability"), bij(t0) is a rm-worker match eect, and cit is an i.i.d.
shock. We could allow for the eect of time-varying rm-specic shocks (such as in Guiso et al.
(2006)) by appropriately re-dening the term cit. The experience and tenure variables are likely
15correlated with the error term. For example, more able people (i.e., with high realizations of ai) may
have stronger labor market attachment and hence longer overall labor market experience. Moreover,
more experienced workers may be in better matches because they have had the opportunity to
search longer while on the job. As for tenure, one might expect rms to re less able workers more
frequently than high ability workers. Moreover, rms are more likely to re (or workers more likely
to quit) when the value of the match is low. This discussion means that OLS applied to (3) will
give biased and inconsistent estimates.
Our identication strategy is a variant of those proposed by Topel (1991) and Dustmann &
Meghir (2005). Let Mit be an indicator variable denoting whether the worker moves (if equal to 1)
or stays with the rm (if equal to 0) between period t 1 and period t: Consider the rst dierenced
version of (1) for individuals who stay with the same employer between t   1 and t (Mit = 0). For
these workers:
lnwij(p;t0)t = ( + ) + X0
ij(p;t0)t + 
Lj(p;t0) + hp + cit (5)
The advantage of this specication is that the sources of endogeneity (the correlation between
tenure/experience and the individual/match xed eects) have been removed. If cit is independent
of Mit (conditional on the observables), then an OLS regression is all that is needed to consistently
estimate the parameters of (5), in particular 
 and ( + ). Note that  and  cannot be separately
identied. If cit depends on Mit (even after conditioning on the observables), then this creates a
standard sample selection issue which can be addressed making distributional assumptions about
the unobservable cit and nding exclusion restrictions for identication. We use three exclusion
restrictions. The rst is whether the current job is one found following exogenous displacement
due to rm closure. Those who are displaced must start searching for a new job sampling from the
unconditional distribution of match values. Those who moved voluntarily to the current rm did
it because they improved their match value, i.e., they sampled from the conditional distribution.
Hence, the probability of being a mover out of the current job must be higher for the displaced
worker than for the average worker (matches found after involuntary displacement are on average
of lower quality than those found by voluntary moves). Since rm closure is an exogenous event
aecting the entire work force of the rm, it is also likely to be independent of shocks aecting
individual wages at some point in the future, i.e., of cit, suggesting it is a valid exclusion restriction.
The second exclusion restriction uses the time to earliest retirement date, taking into account not
only age-based retirement, but also retirement based on the number of years one has contributed
to the social security system.11 In fact, mobility choices are taken trading o current mobility costs
11For a worker of age A we dene the residual work horizon (in months) as minf360-E,(R   A)12g, where E is
16against future wage benets. The longer the horizon, the higher the eect in net present value
terms of a given wage increase following a job change and hence more likely is a move. Under
the assumption that equation (5) is correctly specied, it is reasonable that residual horizon is
orthogonal to cit. However, if returns to tenure vary with tenure, as for instance suggested by
Dustmann & Meghir (2005), this assumption might fail. We come back to this issue in section 7
where we discuss robustness and show that our results are robust to using only the displacement
indicator as an exclusion restriction. Finally, given that mobility costs can dier substantially across
workers because of dierences in the thickness of their local labor market, to capture heterogeneity
in mobility costs and thus in the eect of residual horizon on mobility decision, we let the latter
vary across provinces by including an interaction between the horizon length and province dummies
(as proxies for labor market thickness).
Identication of 
 comes from variation in Lj(p;t0) over time and the fact that over the sample
period workers start their tenures with a given rm in dierent years. Intuitively, we pin down 

by comparing the slope of the wage contract of a worker in province p who starts tenure with rm j
at time t0 (facing nancial constraints Lj(p;t0)) with that of an otherwise similar worker who starts
tenure with the same rm but at time t1 (facing nancial constraints Lj(p;t1) 6= Lj(p;t0)).12 Note
that in order to consistently estimate 
 (even controlling for selection into staying with the same




= 0: Let us be clear about what this assumption
entails. Since average wage growth in the province is absorbed by the province dummies hp, it
requires that shocks to the growth rate of individual wages, net of any common component, at
any time after the worker starts its tenure with the rm are orthogonal to the degree of nancial
development in the province where the job is located at the time tenure starts, Lj(p;t0). We regard
this as a very weak and reasonable requirement.
To obtain an estimate of the other parameter of interest - i.e., , the intercept of the wage-tenure
relationship, which turns out to be key for measuring the extent of borrowing that goes on within
the rm - we use the estimates of , 
 and ( + ) from (5) to construct the residual for individuals
in their rst job in the labor market. For these individuals, Eit = Tij(p;t0)t. Dene the error:
months of labor market experience, and R is the statutory retirement age (60 for males and 55 for females). This
denition accounts for the fact that over the period spanned by our data workers could retire either because of
seniority (30 years or 360 months of paid work) or because of old-age (60 for men, 55 for women).
12Since we can estimate the degree of local nancial development only starting in 1990, for workers joining the
rm before 1990 we assign the degree of nancial development of the province in 1990. This assumption is consistent
with our observation (see Section 3.2) that the structure of the local banking market had been frozen by the 1936
legislation, with little entry and expansion until the 1990s (possibly with the exception of Sicily, see footnote 10).
17eij(p;t0)t = lnwij(p;t0)t   X0
ij(p;t0)t   ( + )Eit   
Eit  Lj(p;t0)
=  + Z0





= 0, regression (6) can be estimated by OLS using the residual b eij(p;t0)t
from (5) in place of the unobserved error eij(p;t0)t. What does this assumption entail? From (4),
"ij(t0)t may be correlated with the level of nancial development of the local market if more able
workers sort into provinces that are on average more nancially developed, or that have some other
attractive features that happen to be correlated with nancial development. Alternatively, "ij(t0)t
may be correlated with nancial development if average matches are of higher quality in more
nancially developed provinces. In both cases, OLS estimates will be biased downward. If these
eects were permanent (plus an inconsequential random error), the province xed eects hp would
capture them and no bias would emerge. That is, suppose there are only two periods (t0 and t1)
and two provinces (p and p0, with Lj(p;t0) > Lj(p0;t0) without loss of generality, so that province

















(and similarly for match eects).
In this case province xed eects would capture the (permanent) composition eects. These eects
can be assumed permanent because the process of convergence across credit markets is slow or it
takes time to attract talent so as to shift the distribution of ability or match values across provinces.
In the absence of convincing instruments for Lj(p;t0), this will be our identifying assumption.
5 Results
Table 5 reports the estimates of equation (5) using only the sample of job stayers. Since the job
staying/moving decision can be endogenous, we present estimates with and without controlling for
selection into new rms (columns 2 and 3 respectively). In column 1 we report the probit estimates
for rm mobility. These are used to construct an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio. The exclusion
restrictions in the mobility probit have the expected eects: the plant closure indicator has a strong
positive eect on mobility and so does the residual worker horizon in all provinces.13 Jointly, the
instruments are highly statistically signicant (the value of the 2 test statistic is 17,269 with 96
degrees of freedom) suggesting that the estimates do not suer from weak exclusion restriction
problems.14
13The estimated eect of the residual work horizon varies between a minimum of 0.001 and a maximum of 0.005
and is statistically signicant at the 5% condence level in 74 out of 95 provinces.
14The value of the 
2 test statistic for the interaction between the residual work horizon and province dummies is
450 (with 94 degrees of freedom).
18In our regressions we control for worker job position (dummies for blue and white collar) and
for year dummies. The latter, in particular, absorb any time variation in interest rate spreads over
the sample period that is due to nation-wide movements in interest rates. Furthermore, since we
can identify the eect of credit constraints out of province-specic time variation, we can insert
a full set of province dummies as controls. Thus, any systematic dierences across provinces (for
instance in average productivity) that is re
ected in wage growth is captured by these controls.
Without province-specic time variation in nancial development, identication of the eect of
nancial frictions on wage contracts using only cross sectional geographical variation in the level
of nancial development would be problematic; in fact, insofar as nancial development also spurs
average productivity growth, it would also capture dierences in the latter on wage growth.15
Column 2 shows the results when no adjustment for sample selection is made. The nancial
frictions indicator has a positive and highly signicant impact on a worker wage rate growth imply-
ing that in provinces with more backward nancial markets rms and workers settle on a steeper
wage prole over the tenure horizon. Ceteris paribus, this implies that when access to the credit
market is more limited, workers will lend to the rm, consistent with the model of Michelacci &
Quadrini (2009). Adjusting for selection (column 2) results in a substantially smaller coecient of
the liquidity constraints indicator - pointing to the importance of accounting for movers' decisions
- but the coecient remains highly statistically signicant (a p-value of 1.5%).
To fully characterize the eect of nancial market imperfections on the shape of the wage
contract, we need to identify not only their eect on the slope but also on the intercept of the
wage prole. In fact, as described in Figure 2, if in less developed nancial markets workers lend
to their rm, the wage prole should have a higher slope and a lower intercept. Table 6 reports
the OLS estimates of equation (6). Column 1 uses the parameters estimated in column 2 of Table
5 to compute the left-hand side of equation (6), while column 2 uses those from the selection
adjusted specication (column 3). We nd a negative and highly statistically signicant eect on
the intercept of the wage prole (the parameter  in equation (6)). It is important to stress that
although we use some of the estimated parameters of the wage growth regression to compute the
left-hand side of equation (6), there is nothing in our exercise that would mechanically produce a
negative estimate of .16
15This is not the case when identifying the bite of nancial frictions out of time variation within each province,
because the source of variation is the exogenous liberalization imposed by the EU directive and because its heteroge-
neous eects across provinces are the consequence of the dierent initial levels of nancial development, themselves
the accidental re
ection of the 1936 legislation as shown in Table 4.
16From (6), measurement error in Lj(p;t0) alone would generate a positive relationship between eij(p;t0)t and Lj(p;t0)
(since b 
 > 0).
19The wage prole shifts downward and tilts upward in provinces with less developed nancial
markets. This is consistent with the view that rms circumvent credit market constraints by
borrowing implicitly from their workers (back-loading compensation). Economically, the values of

 and  using the selection-adjusted estimates imply that the wage of a worker that begins tenure
matched with a rm facing a local market that has an index of nancial backwardness 50% above
the median value in 1997 (roughly 100 basis points) is 17.8% lower than that of an otherwise equal
worker in the median local market for nancial development; but it grows at a rate that is 0.32
percent faster for each month of tenure (3.9% a year). Thus, by itself, heterogeneity in access to
nance across rms is sucient to generate signicant cross sectional heterogeneity in observed
wages paid by (otherwise) similar rms to (otherwise) similar workers. This helps address the
wage heterogeneity puzzle documented by, among others, Krueger & Summers (1988), Abowd &
Kramarz (2000) and Van den Berg (1999).
Of course, since the main eect of credit market imperfections is to twist the wage prole, this
same worker will receive a higher wage at the end of his tenure. Hence, there exists a value of
tenure at which the wage in a nancially developed market equals that in a nancially depressed
market (where proles cross). Using (1), this value, which we denote T, is equal to =
, i.e., about
54 months using our estimates in the second column of Tables 5 and 6. Hence, during the rst 4.5
years of tenure the worker is typically lending to the rm before being repaid.
6 Heterogeneous Eects as an Identication Device
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the idea that the rm can (partially) circumvent
imperfections in nancial markets by appropriately altering the shape of compensation schemes.
While we have argued that the time variation in access to external markets we rely upon stems
from exogenous shocks, a skeptical reader may object that even exogenous dierences in access to
the loans market may result in dierences in the workers' productivity prole and our regressions
would be picking up the latter rather than changes in the wage tenure prole related to borrowing
and lending within the rm. To wit, suppose that wage-tenure proles vary systematically with
borrowing restrictions because the latter change the incentives to invest in human capital which
aect the tenure prole, as in Azariadis (1988). Even if rms pay workers their current productivity,
so that there is no lending within the rm, we would be observing a correlation between our indicator
of nancial backwardness and workers' wage growth. We have two answers to this objection. First,
in order for our results to re
ect variation in productivity proles induced by variation in access
to the loans market, it must be that productivity proles are steeper in less developed nancial
20markets. We nd this unlikely. If either workers or rms have more diculty accessing the loan
market they will invest less in general human capital and will also invest less in specic human
capital. Hence, workers' pay proles should be 
atter, not steeper as we nd, when nancial
development deteriorates. Thus, insofar as variation in access to the loan market also has a direct
eect on workers productivity proles, our estimates are a lower bound of the eect of nancial
frictions on wage contracts.
A second way of addressing this issue and at the same time putting to a tougher test our causal
interpretation is to exploit compensation-relevant heterogeneity in workers' and rms' sensitivities
to borrowing frictions. Suppose that we can identify a set of rms (or workers) that are highly
sensitive to borrowing frictions, for instance because they are highly dependent on outside nance
or have no source of external funding other than bank borrowing. For these rms (or workers)
we should expect, ceteris paribus, the wage contract to be even steeper than for the average rm
(or worker). This heterogeneity in the values of 
 and  is directly predicted by the rm-as-an-
internal-credit-market model and can be used to assess its empirical validity. In some cases, what
this model predicts is opposite to what one should nd if the correlations in Table 5 were due to
dierences in nancial frictions causing dierences in workers productivity proles and can thus be
used to tell the two interpretations apart. Here we focus on two sources of heterogeneity that we
can condently measure.
Firm creditworthiness. The rst source of heterogeneity is dierences in access to credit
within the same local credit market. Firms in the same location but with easier access to their
local credit market should be less in need of raising funds from their workers than rms that have
more trouble accessing the same local credit market. Hence, we should expect that rms with better
access to their local credit market oer 
atter wage proles. We measure rms' ease of obtaining
external funds locally with rms' credit scores. While often heterogeneity in creditworthiness has
been measured by the size of the rm or its age (e.g., Kumar & Francisco (2005) and the references
therein), the use of these variables is dictated more by lack of better alternatives rather than by their
intrinsic merit. In fact, both of these measures are likely to be poor indicators of creditworthiness as
they also re
ect many other features that may aect wage setting independently. This is particularly
important in our context as rm size and age may, inter alia, pick up dierences in human capital
specicity which may also aect the wage contract. In fact, there is a large literature addressing
the empirical regularity that large rms pay higher wages even after controlling for observable
characteristics (see Oi & Idson (1999) for a survey). The credit score allows us to deal with this
issue. This variable is directly available to the banks that belong to the CB consortium and they
21condition their decisions about whether and how much to lend to a rm on its value. Hence, the
score provides a measure of the creditworthiness of any rm on the same metric, irrespective of the
rm's age or size. Consistent with credit scoring measuring dierences in rms creditworthiness, we
nd that, ceteris paribus, good-score rms pay lower interest rates, as discussed in Section 3.4.17
Finally, it is interesting to stress that under the skeptical view that nancial frictions aect wage
proles because they aect directly workers' productivity proles, rms with bad credit scores -
which suer more than good score rms when markets become less nancially developed - should
invest less in worker-specic human capital and thus oer 
atter proles than good score rms.
This is the opposite prediction of a model in which the rm counteracts credit market frictions by
distorting wage proles relative to tenure-productivity proles.
Worker dierential access to the loan market. Following a similar logic, we expect that
workers facing borrowing constraints in the local credit market should be less willing to lend to
their rm (and may even borrow from it) and hence have a 
atter wage tenure prole, that is,
smaller 
 and (in absolute value) . For workers we do not have as good a measure of their
creditworthiness as we have for rms and thus have to rely on a coarser indicator. We proxy for
it with a worker's job type using the distinction between blue collar, white collar and managers
and assume that access to the loan market is more problematic for blue collar workers than it is
for white collar workers and managers. This assumption is backed up by evidence from estimates
of the conditional probability that a loan applicant is turned down by an intermediary obtained
using the Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), which shows that blue collar
workers are signicantly more likely to be denied credit than white collar workers and manager,
conditioning on a variety of controls.18
Table 7 shows the results of the estimates when these interaction eects are added to the
estimates of the wage equation in rst dierences (equation 5) and in levels (equation 6). In each
case we re-estimate (5) by adding an extra interaction term between the indicator of local nancial
17One may wonder why workers are willing to lend more to bad-score rms in a less developed credit market.
One answer is that the riskiness of the rm results in a higher compensating premium for risk that may not be
appealing to a bank. In fact, workers have access to a cheaper monitoring technology than a bank, because for them
information collection about the rm is a by-product of going to work. This makes workers' signals more precise,
reducing conditional uncertainty and making them more willing to lend.
18The Bank of Italy SHIW, run biannually on a representative sample of 8,000 Italian households, contains infor-
mation on whether a loan application was accepted or turned down. We pool the 1998 and 2000 waves and run probit
regressions for whether an application was turned down controlling for demographics, measures of workers' economic
resources, geographic, time, and occupational dummies. Relative to the sample mean, being a blue collar worker
raises the probability of being denied access to the loan market by 8.75%; being a white collar worker and a managers
lowers it respectively by 37% and 49%. Even so, we feel less comfortable when we rely on this indicator than when
we use the rm credit score. Job qualication, in fact, may capture other forces that may give rise to heterogeneous
reactions to nancial market frictions. For instance, it may re
ect dierences in specic human capital.
22frictions and the relevant measure of rm or worker heterogeneity, controlling for any direct eect
that this heterogeneity may have on wage setting.19 The rst two columns show the results when
we interact nancial backwardness with rms' credit scores in the wage growth equation (rst
column) and in the wage level equation (second column), respectively. We divide the credit score
into three categories identied by three dummies: bad, medium and good scores (the excluded
group).20 Controlling for any direct eect the score level may exert on workers wage growth, we
nd that medium score and, even more so, bad score rms oer signicantly steeper wage proles
than good score rms in the same local credit market. Moreover, the estimate of the intercept
becomes smaller for lower score rms as required for the change in the wage-tenure prole to be
interpreted as an implicit credit contract. We want to stress again that this result is in no way
an artifact of our two step estimator. These estimates imply that low-score rms raise more funds
from low-tenure workers in response to local credit market imperfections than good score rms.
Quantitatively, a bad score rm would respond to a deterioration in access to the local credit
market by adjusting the steepness of the wage prole oered to its workers 1.5 times more than a
medium score rm, and 6.9 times more than a good score rm, which would oer much 
atter wage
contracts. Moreover, at a level of nancial backwardness of 1, low score rms pay a wage level at
the beginning of tenure that is 9.4 percent lower than that paid by similar rms operating in the
same local credit market but with a good credit score (7 percent lower for medium score rms).
This result speaks in support of the rm-as-a credit market model and against the idea that our
ndings re
ect the eects of credit frictions on human capital accumulation.
The last two columns of Table 7 show the results when the indicator of local credit market
frictions is interacted with the manager and white collar dummies, as proxies for workers' credit-
worthiness (blue collar workers are the excluded group). Consistent with this interpretation we nd
that in response to nancial frictions rms oer steeper proles to managers (deemed to face easier
access to the local credit market) than to white collar workers, and the latter in turn obtain steeper
compensation proles than blue collar workers (deemed to rank low in terms of creditworthiness).
For the three types of workers, the estimates of 
 are 0:0025, 0:0055 and 0:0115 respectively. The
estimates of the intercept shift is always negative in this case as well and more so for the group of
workers that are more willing to lend to the rm. The point estimates of  for blue collar workers,
white collar workers and managers are respectively  0:147,  0:226 and  0:448, respectively. These
19In each case, we re-estimate the mobility probit adding the extra variables that appear in the wage growth
equation and construct a new Mills ratio to control for selection into staying with the same rm.
20The credit score is a number between 1 and 9 with higher values signaling lower creditworthiness. We assign
rms with a number between 7 and 9 to the \bad score" category (19%); rms with a number between 4 and 6 to
the \medium score" category (47%); the remainders are in the excluded category (34%).
23estimates of 
 and  imply substantial dierences in the way rms design contracts so as to obtain
more funds from workers who have a higher propensity to lend.
7 Robustness
In this section we assess the robustness of the previous results along various margins. The key
question we want to address is: does the nding of a downward shift and an upward tilt of the
wage prole in more backward credit markets survive when we change the regression specication
or sample?
A rst issue is that our identication strategy relies on variation in nancial development across
local credit markets. Clearly local credit market conditions are binding for rms only if they cannot
borrow outside the boundaries of the local market. This is less likely to be the case for large rms,
which can raise funds outside the borders of the province where they are located (through, say,
remote bank lending or issuance of corporate bonds). Though most rms in our sample are small
(median employment is 30), the rm size threshold that qualies a rm for borrowing outside its
province is unobserved, and this introduces measurement error in the matching between a rm and
the relevant credit market condition that it and its workers face. To account for this we repeat our
estimation exercise restricting the sample to workers employed in rms with fewer than 30 employees
at the beginning of the sample - a rather stringent criteria. The rst two columns of Table 8 show
the estimates. The rst column reports the eect of credit market backwardness on the slope of the
wage tenure prole, the second column reports the eect on its intercept using the same two-step
methodology as in Tables 5 and 6 (to save on space we only report the estimates of the relevant
coecients in the robustness check at hand). Though we lose about 250,000 observations (and
with them statistical precision), we still nd that tenure proles are steeper in less developed credit
markets and wages are lower at the beginning of tenure and higher towards the end. Furthermore,
consistent with local credit market conditions binding more for smaller rms, the eect on the
slope and the intercept are stronger in this sample of very small rms than in the overall sample.
The other columns use less stringent criteria to restrict the sample: columns three and four focus
on rms with less than 100 workers, and the last two columns focus on rms with size below the
mean. In this case results are closer to those for the whole sample.
Another issue, mentioned at the end of Section 4, is that returns to tenure may not be con-
stant as implied by our main specication, but depend on attained tenure itself (Dustmann &
Meghir 2005). To allow for non-linear returns to tenure we modify equation (1) to include a
quadratic term in tenure and its interaction with our measure of nancial market backwardness.
24The estimation strategy remains unchanged. The wage growth equation, estimated only on the
sample of rm stayers, includes two extra variables, a linear term in tenure and its interaction
with the nancial market backwardness variable (which identify the eect of the quadratic term
in wage (log) level equation). Results for this specication are reported in Table 9. Because of
the dierent specication, we report the full results for the wage growth equation and the wage
level equation separately. The negative and signicant eect of the linear term in tenure in the
wage growth equation implies that the wage prole is concave in tenure, consistent with Dustmann
and Meghir's ndings (Panel A). However, this does not aect the previous conclusion that wage
tenure proles are steeper in rms facing more backward credit markets. In fact the eect of credit
market imperfections on wage growth is positive at all levels of tenure (the quadratic term is small
and insignicant). Furthermore, even for this specication the estimate of the wage level equation
shows that the intercept of the wage tenure prole is lower in less developed local credit markets
conrming the previous results (Panel B).
In Table 10 we check the robustness of our results vis- a-vis four additional issues. First, we
need to consider a subtle form of non-random attrition. The estimates of (6) use a variable number
of observations for each individual. Individuals who stay longer with the initial rm naturally
contribute more observations. However, longer tenures are typically associated with higher match
values or higher ability, creating a possible form of sample selection bias. One simple way of
addressing this problem is to \balance" the panel articially by using only the rst year in the
labor market for each individual. This is what we do in Panel A (the rst dierence results are the
same as for the main sample, and reported for completeness). The results show that even when
accounting for this type of attrition, and notwithstanding the substantially smaller sample, credit
market ineciency still results in a lower wage level at the beginning of tenure.
Second, one may wonder whether the results are robust to the exclusion restrictions imposed in
the worker mobility selection equation. While we cannot test the exclusion restrictions directly, we
can check informally whether the results are sensitive to adopting a more parsimonious strategy,
and hence impose only the least controversial restriction. Specically, we retain only the rm
closure dummy as the identifying variable in the selection equation. Estimation results based on
the restricted instrument set are shown in Panel B; the sign, size and signicance of the eect on
the slope and intercept are not much dierent from the estimates obtained in Tables 5 and 6.
Third, in Panel C we exclude from the regressions the Sicilian provinces. As mentioned in
footnote 10, Sicily is anomalous because its credit market appears more competitive than other
Southern regions due to a number of institutional factors. However, the results excluding Sicily are
25virtually identical to those obtained including it.
A nal concern relates to the eects of the local business cycle conditions on the wage prole.
Suppose that workers who join a rm during a weak local labor market receive lower initial wages,
but later they experience faster wage growth due to a mean reversion eect. If the spread between
the rates on loans and deposits increases when local labor market conditions are poor, due for
example to an (uncontrolled for) increase in the risk premium, our specication may be capturing
this eect rather than implicit borrowing. To allay this worry, we augment our regressions with
the local unemployment rate at the time of hiring, Uj(p;t0), and its interaction with tenure.21 If
the eect we are describing is at play, we should nd that Uj(p;t0) is positive in the wage growth
equation and negative in the level equation and that the credit market backwardness variable
becomes insignicant. In fact, the eect of Uj(p;t0) is negative (and signicant) in the wage growth
equation and in the level equation (but insignicant). Moreover, the estimates of 
 and  are robust
to the introduction of this further control (Table 10, Panel D).
In sum, the results in Tables 5 and 6 display remarkably little sensitivity to exclusion of larger
rms, allowance for non-linear wage tenure relations, non-random attrition, variations in the set
of exclusion restrictions used for identication, and other confounding eects, such as wage eects
induced by local business cycle conditions when starting a job. Across a large variety of samples
and specications, we conrm evidence of a lower initial wage and a steeper wage tenure prole
in nancially backward credit markets, consistent with the idea that rms borrow implicitly from
their workers.
8 Assessing implicit interest rates and credit 
ows
We now assess the implied interest rate and the size of the implicit credit 
ows, comparing them
with prices and quantities observed in the credit market. We pool observations over all available
years to estimate the tenure distribution, average wages at each tenure within each province, and
the degree of credit market imperfections faced by workers at the time they joined the rm. In
what follows, therefore, we drop the time, rm and individual subscripts.22 From equation (3), a
21Similar to what was done for Lj(p;t0), for people hired before 1990 we use the unemployment rate recorded in
1990.
22Ideally, we would construct time-varying measures of average wage by tenure and of the tenure distribution.
Unfortunately, for many provinces we do not have enough observations to do that. Financial development must be
measured as of the year when the worker entered the job. Given that we take the cross sectional average, for each
province we construct nancial development for those with tenure T as the weighted average of nancial development




npT Lp(t T) where nptT is the number of workers with
tenure T in year t, npT =
P
t nptT is the total number of workers with tenure T over our sample period, and Lp(t T)
is the credit market backwardness index measured in the year the worker joined the rm.
26rm located in province p pays a wage wpT = e(+
T)LpTwpT to a worker of tenure T, with wpT
being the wage that the same rm would pay if located in the most competitive credit market
(where LpT = 0). It follows that the amount of implicit borrowing from a worker with tenure T in







By construction, BorrowingpT is positive as long as T  T (the tenure at which the worker begins
being repaid). It represents savings on wage payments due to the dierent tenure prole compared
to the province with the most developed nancial market. In terms of gure 1, BorrowingpT is the
vertical distance between the baseline line and that for the case of rms borrowing from workers.
A rst check of the implications of our estimates is based on comparing implicit borrowing and
repayment 
ows. In fact, the worker lends to the rm up to T and is repaid after that. If we
impose the condition that the expected 
ows to and from the rm are actuarially equal, we can
compute the internal rate of return (IRR), i.e., the interest rate that makes the expected stream
of borrowing and repayments implicit in the tenure proles equal to zero in net present value.










where T is the survival probability, i.e., the probability that a worker is still attached to the
rm at tenure T, computed from the actual tenure distribution (assuming for simplicity that all
tenure spells are completed). This expression represents the expected net present value of implicit
borrowing and repayments.23 The rst row of Table 11 reports the results of this exercise for the
most backward province (Cosenza), the one at the 75th percentile of the nancial backwardness
distribution (Lecce), at the 50th percentile (Ragusa), at the 25th percentile (Trento). We nd that
the average IRR is 2.9%, with considerable cross-province heterogeneity: it is 3.7% in Cosenza and
Lecce, 1.2% in Ragusa, 2.4 in Trento.24 Ideally, the IRR should be above the interest rate that
workers can obtain on their savings and below the interest rate that rms pay on bank loans.25 In
fact, in the 1990-97 period, the cross-country average real interest rate on loans was 10.1% and on
deposits 0.6%; in Cosenza, they were 10.6% and -0.2% and in Trento 9.9% and 0.92%. Our values
are exactly within these ranges: both workers and rms benet from transacting. An IRR of 2-4%
indicates that the surplus is split but rms appropriate a larger share.
23We are implicitly assuming that rms and workers are risk neutral.
24Note that, due to dierences in wages and in the tenure structure across provinces, the IRR need not be monotonic
in the degree of credit market backwardness.
25Given that the repeated interaction between rm and workers might allow for transactions that, due to asymmetric
information, do not take place in nancial markets, the observed interest rate on loans might underestimate the shadow
value of credit for a rm.
27We have considered how the implied IRR changes with dierent values of the parameters 
 and
. We found that proportional parameter changes that leave T =  =
 unchanged aect the IRR
only marginally. For example, increasing both  and 
 by 20% implies an average IRR of 2.3%,
while decreasing both parameters by 20% implies an average IRR of 3.5%. Proportional changes in
the estimates of the parameters do not aect our results dramatically, so that we can focus on T
to assess the sensitivity of the IRR to parameter changes. As one should expect, the implied IRR
is more sensitive to changes in T. Setting T = 50, approximately a 10% drop, implies an average
IRR of 5.6%, while a T = 45 implies an IRR of almost 9%. In fact, moving the crossing point in
Figure 1 to the left requires a higher interest rate to equate the implicit borrowing and repayment

ows. On the other side, increasing the crossing point to T = 60 (approximately a 10% increase)
implies an average IRR of 1.1%, while further increases lead to an average IRR of zero.
We next assess the size of the implicit credit 
ows between workers and rms, comparing it
to bank borrowing to gauge the relevance of this nancing channel. We describe the measures of
borrowing brie
y here and supply all the details in the appendix. We measure gross lending as
the savings on wage payments that a rm facing a local market with nancial frictions obtains
from workers with tenure T  T compared to being located in the most developed local nancial
market. We compute two measures of borrowing: rst, maximum borrowing, that is, the stock of
implicit debt that the rm has towards a worker of tenure T: in Figure 1, this is the area between
the baseline and the case II line for T  T. Second, borrowing per worker, that is the average
per worker stock of debt toward the workers with T  T, for an hypothetical rm with a tenure
distribution equal to the actual tenure distribution at the provincial level. This measure can be
directly compared with bank debt per employee. We obtain information on bank borrowing from
the CB data service.26 We take the average bank debt per employee at the provincial level, pooling
observations over the 1990-97 years, to which the worker data refer.
In Table 11 we report the results for the various statistics described above. For Cosenza,
the maximum borrowing is almost 12,000 euros. This means that a worker with tenure T has
accumulated a credit towards the rm on the order of 1.5 years of earnings. The value decreases
with nancial development, but it still amounts to 5,700 euros for the province of Trento, at the 25th
percentile of the credit backwardness distribution. Implicit borrowing per worker is between 1,500
and 3,000 euros. In the most backward province implicit borrowing per worker is 2,762 euros while
bank borrowing per worker is around 8,000 euros. This means that borrowing from the workers is
26The CB is likely to overestimate the amount of bank borrowing per employee, as only rms with a certain
degree of credit-worthiness are included. This implies that, if anything, the comparison between bank borrowing and
borrowing from workers is biased towards nding a more important role for bank borrowing.
28approximately one third of that from banks. And since bank borrowing per employee in the most
nancially developed province is approximately twice as large that of Cosenza, around one third of
the dierence in bank borrowing between the most and the least backward province is made up by
borrowing from workers. As expected, the magnitude of implicit borrowing tends to decrease with
nancial development. For example, in Trento, at the 25th percentile of the nancial backwardness
distribution, implicit borrowing per worker is 1,432 euros, less than 10% of loans from banks. The
cross province average is 1,645, 11% of bank loans.
All in all, we nd that the nancial sector is the main nancing channel for rms even in
underdeveloped markets, but implicit credit 
ows between workers and rms can supplement sub-
stantially explicit credit 
ows from nancial intermediaries.
9 Conclusions
It has long been theoretically recognized that the repeated relationships established within the
rm between workers, on the one hand, and entrepreneurs on the other can go a long way towards
tempering the eects of credit and insurance market frictions. They can even go as far as providing
a basis for the existence of the rm (Bovenberg & Teulings 2002). Yet, very little progress has been
made in pinning down empirically the importance of the rm as an insurance provider and as an
internal credit market. Our previous work (Guiso et al. 2005) shows evidence of the role of the rm
as an insurance market against idiosyncratic shocks to a rm's productivity. This paper shows how
much credit can take place within the rm and establishes that there is substantial lending 
owing
from workers to rms, with its size related to the degree of credit market frictions. Thus, the
evidence we provide lends empirical support to the idea that the employment relationship allows
reduction of the adverse consequences of poorly working credit markets.
While we have focused on nancial trades between employees and employers, the same factor
that makes these trades possible - the human capital specicity that ties workers to their company
- might also facilitate intertemporal monetary exchanges between workers in the same rm. The
literature has so far studied the rst type of exchanges, but the latter may, quantitatively, also
be relevant. Even more interestingly, the possibility of nancial exchanges between workers may
reinforce nancial exchanges between employees and employers: knowing that she can borrow from
her colleagues when facing an adverse shock, a worker may be more willing to lend to her employer.
We regard this as an interesting topic for future research.
29A Appendix
A.1 Data details
Our initial workers sample is composed of social security records for individuals aged 18 to 60
with non missing social security codes, positive reported earnings, and consistent monthly employ-
ment codes (642,361 records and 112,303 individuals). A worker may have multiple social security
contribution records in a given year (if, say, she had multiple employers in that year). We drop
those with multiple concurrent jobs (because moves are hard to identify), those who receive social
security contributions from a rm after it goes bankrupt (because it may signal a merger or acqui-
sition rather than a closure), and those who have spells at a given rm separated by intervening
spells at other rms (because the concept of tenure is not very clear cut). These selections reduce
our sample to 508,342 records and 96,444 individuals. We drop individuals who have one or more
outlier monthly earnings records (a decline greater than 70% or an increase greater than 400%).
We lose 35,759 records and 6,095 individuals. Since we need to estimate wage growth equations, we
also drop workers observed for only one year (15,596 records). Finally, we eliminate records with
missing information on the province of work, because we cannot match them to information about
local credit market imperfections (3,010 records).27 Our nal sample consists of 454,675 records
corresponding to 74,520 individuals.28
The rm data are collected by the Company Accounts Data Services, which was established in
the early 1980s jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking Association and a pool of leading
banks to gather and share information on borrowers. Since the banks rely heavily on it in granting
and pricing loans, the data are subject to extensive quality controls by a pool of professionals, so
measurement error should be negligible. While the CB data are reasonably representative of the
entire population in terms of distribution by sector and geographical area (Guiso & Schivardi 2007),
the focus on level of borrowing skews the sample towards relatively larger rms: CB reporting rms
account for approximately half of total employment and 7% of the number of rms in manufacturing.
A.2 Credit 
ows denition
To compute the total debt towards a worker with tenure T, note that the rm has been bor-
rowing from such worker Borrowingp0 in the rst month of employment, Borrowingp1 in the
second month, and so on. Given the interest rate r, the present value of Borrowingp0 is (1 +
27We impute the province of work when we nd clear coding errors.
28Note that, given that mobility requires knowledge about current and past employers, the rst observation for
each worker is lost and hence the probit regression in Table 5 uses only 380,125 observations. The wage growth
regression uses only 329,545 observations because it conditions on staying with the same rm.
30r)T
p0Borrowingp0 and similarly for subsequent 








Following the results on the IRR, we will use an annual interest rate of 3%. Results are not very
sensitive to alternative values of r, given that the average tenure (weighted by the share of workers
at each tenure level) is about 6 years. Cumulative BorrowingpT reaches a maximum at T,
after which the rm starts repaying the worker and BorrowingpT turns negative. The maximum
stock of debt that a rm can accumulate form a worker is therefore Maximum Borrowingp =
Cumulative BorrowingpT.
The basic idea we use to construct a measure of borrowing from the workers can be illustrated
with a simple example. Consider a model in which workers work for two periods and dene them
as junior in the rst and senior in the second period. Junior workers lend implicitly to the rm,
which pays them back when senior. A rm born at time 1 hires a junior worker, from whom it
borrows implicitly B; at time 2, the rm hires another junior worker, from whom it also borrows B,
and pays back the \loan" to the former junior workers, now turned senior; from period 3 onward,
the senior worker retires, the junior turns senior and is paid back and the rm hires another junior
worker from whom it borrows. In this scheme, starting in period 2 the 
ows of borrowing and
repayments are equal in NPV terms. Still, the rm has an outstanding stock of debt equal to
B, because in the rst period it received the implicit loan B without any repayment being made.
This loan will be repaid when the rm stops hiring, in which case it will make the payment to the
senior worker without borrowing from the junior one. Until then, the rm is borrowing from its
workers the amount B. This idea can be generalized to a rm with a given steady-state distribution
of workers' tenures. We consider an hypothetical rm with a unit mass of workers, with a tenure
distribution equal to the actual tenure distribution at the provincial level. Recall that the rm's
borrowing from a worker with tenure T is Cumulative BorrowingpT. The total stock of debt for
the hypothetical rm with one \representative" worker is therefore:




Implicit borrowing per worker represents the stock of debt that the rm has accumulated towards
workers with seniority smaller or equal to T, where each seniority level is weighted according
to the actual seniority distribution in the province. Given that this hypothetical rm has one
representative employee.
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34Table 1: Workers' characteristics
Variable Mean
(st.dev.)














Experience (in months) 117
(81)








Median rm size 32
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the workers in the whole sample used in estimation
(454,675 records). Standard deviations in parenthesis. Data on rm size are available only for a
subset of those (411,302). Monthly earnings are gross earnings, expressed in 1995 euros.























Note: The table shows summary statistics for the rms used to compute the credit market back-
wardness variable (approximately 250,000 rm-year observations). Monetary values are expressed
in 1995 thousand euros.
36Table 3: Financial market backwardness
Province Lp Lp;1990  Province Lp Lp;1990  Province Lp Lp;1990 
Agrigento 1.21 1.14 0.38 Frosinone 1.87 1.63 0.24 Pistoia 1.78 1.63 0.10
Alessandria 1.08 1.36 -0.79 Genova 1.93 1.78 -0.14 Pordenone 1.97 1.64 -0.32
Ancona 1.65 0.59 1.42 Gorizia 2.18 2.32 -0.43 Potenza 2.21 1.98 0.45
Aosta 1.31 1.38 -0.16 Grosseto 1.22 1.47 0.45 Ragusa 1.69 1.62 0.29
Arezzo 2.45 2.14 0.07 Imperia 0.66 1.20 -0.54 Ravenna 0.42 0.00 0.36
Ascoli 2.69 2.55 0.04 Isernia 2.99 2.73 -0.38 Reggio C. 3.02 2.46 0.70
Asti 0.63 0.84 -0.55 L'Aquila 2.26 2.03 0.18 Reggio E. 1.23 0.79 -0.03
Avellino 3.04 3.31 -0.14 Laspezia 1.64 1.60 0.14 Rieti 2.38 2.26 -0.09
Bari 1.75 1.28 0.58 Latina 2.43 2.51 -0.89 Roma 1.78 2.06 -0.48
Belluno 1.72 1.92 -0.90 Lecce 2.40 2.10 1.32 Rovigo 2.02 2.40 -1.26
Benevento 2.89 3.74 -1.70 Livorno 0.79 0.73 0.41 Salerno 2.59 2.65 -0.18
Bergamo 1.25 1.65 -0.72 Lucca 1.74 1.79 -0.39 Sassari 1.66 1.63 0.30
Bologna 1.07 0.76 0.11 Macerata 1.64 0.60 1.79 Savona 0.61 0.74 -0.64
Bolzano 1.44 1.32 -0.63 Mantova 0.63 0.87 -0.43 Siena 1.53 1.50 -0.65
Brescia 2.42 2.51 -0.68 Massa 1.34 1.27 -0.15 Siracusa 1.65 0.99 1.30
Brindisi 2.42 2.24 0.49 Matera 1.79 2.14 -0.33 Sondrio 0.59 1.61 -1.28
Cagliari 1.75 1.58 0.08 Messina 1.32 1.41 0.07 Taranto 2.73 3.42 -1.11
Caltanisetta 1.39 0.96 1.41 Milano 2.06 1.84 0.21 Teramo 2.51 2.52 -0.52
Campobasso 1.42 1.49 -0.90 Modena 1.06 0.33 0.62 Terni 2.28 1.88 0.52
Caserta 3.33 3.57 -0.75 Napoli 3.31 3.30 -0.48 Torino 1.62 1.82 -0.67
Catania 1.98 1.79 0.73 Novara 1.69 1.59 0.17 Trapani 1.22 0.54 1.10
Catanzaro 2.18 3.05 -0.86 Nuoro 1.98 2.16 -0.13 Trento 1.65 1.06 0.58
Chieti 2.81 2.36 0.20 Oristano 1.71 0.61 0.83 Treviso 2.15 1.96 -0.46
Como 1.92 1.90 -0.26 Padova 2.20 2.17 -0.69 Trieste 1.54 1.59 -0.26
Cosenza 2.79 3.92 -1.74 Palermo 1.55 1.45 0.40 Udine 2.08 1.36 0.39
Cremona 1.64 1.41 0.21 Parma 0.41 0.20 -0.10 Varese 1.91 1.78 -0.05
Cuneo 0.40 0.85 -0.85 Pavia 1.43 1.46 -0.10 Venezia 1.95 1.92 -0.20
Enna 1.56 0.66 1.71 Perugia 2.23 1.76 0.60 Vercelli 2.23 2.37 -0.49
Ferrara 1.62 1.28 -0.05 Pesaro 1.48 0.04 1.86 Verona 1.98 2.05 -0.61
Firenze 1.74 1.40 0.73 Pescara 2.18 1.95 0.22 Vicenza 1.95 1.72 -0.18
Foggia 1.30 0.98 -0.36 Piacenza 0.81 0.54 0.10 Viterbo 0.57 0.21 0.39
Forl  0.66 0.82 -0.29 Pisa 1.81 1.63 -0.65 Average 1.76 1.66 -0.35
Note: The table reports the time average of indicator of credit market imperfection in each
Italian province (Lp), its value in 1990, the rst year of our sample just prior to the start of the
liberalization (Lp;1990) and the change in the indicator between 1990 and 1997, the last sample year
().
37Table 4: The convergence process










Note: This table shows regressions of the change in the indicator of local nancial market im-
perfections following nancial liberalization and the degree of credit market imperfection prevailing
in a province before liberalization. The rst column shows OLS estimates, the second reports IV
estimates using as instruments for the initial level of the indicator the measures of banking local
banking structure in 1936 used by Guiso et al. (2004). Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis.





















Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes
Inverse Mills ratio 0:0745
(0:0032)




Province dummies* Residual Horizon Yes
N 380,125 329,545 329,545
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the wage growth equation for the sample of
workers that stay with the rm. Column (P1) shows the results of the probit estimates for the
workers that have moved. Columns (WG1) and (WG2) report the estimates of equation (3). Robust
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.










Province dummies Yes Yes
N 51,341 51,341
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the wage level equation for the sample of workers
in their rst job. The left-hand side variable is computed using the parameters estimates from Table
5 as in equation (6). Estimates in column 1 use parameters from column 1 in Table 5, Panel A to
construct the left-hand sid variable; estimates in column 2 use parameters from column 2 in Table
5. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
40Table 7: The eect of rm and worker characteristics









































N 83,088 9,312 329,545 51,341
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the wage growth equation (3) and the wage
level equation (6) allowing for the response in the slope of the tenure prole to credit market
frictions to dier across dierent types of rms and workers. Robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis
41Table 8: Robustness Analysis: Using small rms
Initial size < 30 Initial size < 100 Initial size < 2,500













N 67,297 29,878 84,515 35,542 114,410 45,025
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the wage growth equation (3) and the wage
level equation (6) restricting the sample to workers employed by \small" rms. Firm size is dened
using the number of workers employed by the rm as of the rst time we observe the match in the
1990-97 period. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
42Table 9: Robustness Analysis: Quadratic tenure prole























Note: The table shows the estimation results of the wage growth equation (3) and the wage
level equation (6) allowing for a quadratic in tenure in the level equation. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis.
43Table 10: Robustness Analysis: Other concerns
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C: Panel D:
Using a rst-job, Reducing the set of Excluding Sicily Controlling for local
rst-year sample exclusion restrictions unempl. rate at start

















N 329,545 17,410 329,545 51,341 315,432 48,217 329,545 51,341
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the wage growth equation (3) and the wage level
equation (6) for four dierent samples or specications. In Panel A we estimate the level equation
for a sample of individuals in their rst year in the labor market (i.e., with zero labor market
experience). In Panel B we use only the rm bankruptcy dummy as an exclusion restriction in the
mobility probit. In Panel C we exclude Sicilian provinces. In Panel D we add to our regression the
unemployment rate and its interaction with tenure (with the same timing of the nancial market
backwardness variable). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
44Table 11: Size of the Credit Flows
Degree of credit market backwardness:
Max 75th pct Median 25th pct Average
(Cosenza) (Lecce) (Ragusa) (Trento)
Internal rate of return 3.7% 3.7% 1.2% 2.4% 2.9%
Maximum borrowing 11,832 6,729 5,473 5,732 6,747
Implicit borrowing per worker 2,762 1,739 1,290 1,432 1,645
Bank borrowing per worker 8,120 5,783 11,176 16,007 15,321
Borrowing from workers/from banks 0.34 0.30 0.12 0.09 0.11
Note: The table reports the estimates of the internal rate of return and of the dimension
of implicit borrowing for dierent values of the degree of local credi market development. The
internal rate of return is the interest rate that equalizes the expected 
ow of borrowing and lending;
Maximum borrowing is the cumulated debt towards a worker of tenure T, when it reaches the
maximum. Implicit borrowing per worker is the average implicit debt per worker.
45